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A DECONSTRUCTION OF THE TERM 
 “REVOLUTION”
The precise meaning of the concept of (political) revolution remains semantically contested. 
According to Arslanian (2013:127) this concept “is often used liberally, applied to everything from 
the ‘Social Media Revolution’ to the ‘Sexual Revolution’”. Brinton (1965:1-4) agrees, referring 
to revolution as a concept that “troubles the semanticist not only because of its wide range in 
popular usage, but also because it is one of those words charged with emotional content”. 
In some instances revolution even becomes a “holy word” with an a priori moral force which 
sets preconditions for moral righteousness. It seems that “the revolution” can become just as 
important as a religion would be. This same revolution/religion also provides the opportunity to 
gain material and immaterial goods for human-kind (Marcuse, 2001:123). Koselleck (as quoted by 
Marinelli; 2014:8) argues that the semantics of the concept revolution is by no means unequivocal. 
The goal of this article therefore is to address the semantic vagueness of the political concept 
of revolution through a literature analysis, subsequently listing observable characteristics of the 
phenomenon. As such, this article is a theoretical effort contributing to what Babbie and Mouton 
(2008:113) call the hermeneutic cycle of ever-deepening understanding in which the different 
observables of revolution will be arrived at via the deconstruction of various definitions from 
wide-ranging schools of thought and ideas of revolution.
Key concepts: Revolution, deconstruction; characterisation. 
Die presiese betekenis van die konsep (politieke) revolusie is semanties omstrede. Volgens 
Arslanian (2013:127) word die konsep algemeen gebruik om enigiets van die ‘Sosiale Media 
Revolusie’ tot die ‘Seksuele Revolusie’ te beskryf. Brinton (1965:1-4) stem hiermee saam en 
beskryf revolusie as ŉ konsep wat problematies is vir die semantikus omdat dit in die populêre 
taal gebruik word en omdat dit met emosionele inhoud gelaai is. In sommige omstandighede 
word revolusie selfs ŉ “heilige woord” met ŉ a priori morele mag wat die voorvereistes bevat vir 
geregtigheid. Dit blyk dat “die revolusie” net so belangrik kan raak soos wat ŉ religie kan wees. 
Hierdie revolusie/religie voorsien dan die geleentheid om materiële en niemateriële goedere 
deur die mensdom te versamel (Marcuse, 2001:123). Koselleck (soos aangehaal deur Marinelli 
2014:8) argumenteer dat die betekenis van revolusie allermins ondubbelsinnig is. Die doel van 
die artikel is dan om die semantiese vaagheid van die politieke term rewolusie te ontleed deur 
ŉ literatuurstudie waarna die waarneembare kenmerke van die verskynsel gelys sal word. As 
sulks poog die artikel om ŉ teoretiese bydrae te maak tot wat Babbie and Mouton (2008:113) die 
hermeneutiese siklus van dieperwordende begrip noem en waarin verskillende waarneembare 
kenmerke van revolusie geïdentifiseer sal word deur die dekonstruksie van verkillende definisies 
beskryf in verskillende denkskole. 
Kernbegrippe: Revolusie, dekonstruksie; karakterisering.
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A deconstruction of the term “revolution”
1 INTRODUCTION
The precise meaning of the concept of (political) revolution 
remains discursive. According to Arslanian (2013:127) this 
concept “is often used liberally, applied to everything from the 
‘Social Media Revolution’ to the ‘Sexual Revolution’”. Brinton 
(1965:1-4) agrees with this statement, calling revolution a 
“looser word” that “troubles the semanticist not only because 
of its wide range in popular usage, but also because it is one of 
those words charged with emotional content”. Koselleck (as 
quoted by Marinelli, 2014:8) argues in a similar vein and states 
that the semantics of the concept revolution is by no means 
unequivocal, due to the fact that it has become a modern slogan. 
Marinelli (2014:10) further argues for a semantic analysis to 
restore meaning to a word often used in society and politics, 
also in South Africa. In China and South Africa for example the 
concept revolution is almost a “holy word” with an a priori moral 
force which sets preconditions “for the moral righteousness of 
each and every other thing” (Xiaobo, as quoted by Marinelli 
2014:10). It seems that “the revolution” can become just as 
important as a religion would be. This same revolution/religion 
also provides the opportunity to gain material and immaterial 
goods (Marcuse, 2001:123).
Given what was said above, this article will address the 
semantic vagueness of the political concept of revolution 
through a literature analysis, subsequently listing observable 
characteristics of the phenomenon of political revolution 
gained from the literature. The process of literature analysis 
entails a deconstruction of various sources that according to 
Hirst (2014:15) mobilizes analytical and conceptual tools in 
a critical way and resist traditions, thoughts and praxis from 
which the tools and even the author originate.    
The literature that will be used in this article can be divided into 
the following sections: 
Firstly, the various definitions from the various traditions 
and schools of thought dealing with the definition of the 
concept of revolution will be deconstructed to find descriptive 
elements. Secondly, the works of three eminent scholars (each 
from a different school of thought regarding revolution) will 
be deconstructed in order to add to the list of characteristics. 
Firstly, however, a note on methodological aspects employed in 
this article. 
For the purposes of this article deconstruction is defined as the 
examination that challenges comfortable assumptions about 
the topic under analysis (Hirst, 2014:15; Rossetti, 1992:211). 
Furthermore the structure of the article will be deductive 
in analysing existing literature and schools of thought and 
collating specific observables for the concept revolution. Thus 
this article will endeavour to arrange and systematise the 
specific observables of the concept ‘revolution’ found in the 
different branches of the various schools of thought. As such, 
this article is a theoretical effort contributing to what Babbie 
and Mouton (2008:113) call the hermeneutic cycle of ever-
deepening understanding in which the different observables of 
revolution will be arrived at via the deconstruction of various 
definitions from wide-ranging schools of thought and ideas. 
This list of observables can be seen as a nominal definition, or 
what Babbie and Mouton (2008:113) call a proposed working 
definition or tentative definition. In a follow-up article these 
characteristics will then be proposed as a working definition 
and will be tested against a revolution that occurred during the 
“Arab Spring1” of 2010 to 2015. Firstly, however, an analysis of 
the academic traditions concerning the study of the idea and 
concept of revolution. 
2 ACADEMIC TRADITIONS AND 
SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT 
Three main traditions exist that offer definitions of the concept 
‘revolution’: firstly, the Marxists with scholars/practitioners 
such as Lenin, Mao and Marx; secondly, the Functionalists with 
scholars such as Huntington, Brinton and Pettee; and a third 
group (with sub-groups) offering Psychological explanations. It 
goes without saying that the various definitions generated by 
these various schools do not emphasise the same principles and 
that there is some degree of confusion as to what a revolution 
is. In the following paragraphs, examples will be provided 
of definitions of the concept of revolution from the various 
traditions and schools of thought identified above. These 
definitions will be deconstructed and the various elements of 
revolution will be identified in order to formulate observable 
elements of revolution. 
3 THE DECONSTRUCTION OF 
DEFINITIONS AND THE IDENTIFIABLE 
ELEMENTS OF REVOLUTION 
Firstly, an example of a Functionalist definition: 
“A revolution is a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic 
change in the dominant values and myths of society, in 
its political institutions, social structure, leadership and 
government activity and policies” (Huntington 2006:264).
To a functionalist, conflict (revolution) is seen as common, 
even endemic, but not necessary or desirable. In this sense, 
violence and revolution constitute only one of the many ways 
in which social change can develop. Thus, revolution is the 
exception, not the norm. The Mass Society theory (as a sub-
group of the Functionalist theory) argues that the presence of 
certain structural characteristics in society provides inbuilt 
stability. If for some reason these traditional structures 
disengage, the probability of mass revolution increases. 
Huntington (2006:55), however, sees a revolution as a relatively 
temporary phenomenon with a beginning and an end that are 
usually not too far apart.
 
 
 
1  The Arab spring was the pro-democracy regime changes that spread 
across Northern Africa and the Middle East from 2010 onwards.  
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Secondly, an example of a Marxist definition: 
The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of 
class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, 
lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, 
oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to 
one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, 
now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a 
revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the 
common ruin of the contending classes (Marx 1992:3). 
For Marxist scholars, revolution is a necessary predestined 
locomotive of history; it is the law of nature, and so indeed 
all history is the story of revolution. Revolution, thus, will of 
necessity occur; although as becomes clear from the works of 
Lenin and Mao, a revolutionary must strategize, keep secrets 
and operate undercover to promote certain desirable outcomes. 
The revolutionary process is not necessarily an open process; it 
must be a strategized one, reliant on move and countermove. 
Thus, the process of revolution is not necessarily a process 
that will be completed rapidly. Mao speaks of “a hundred 
years” for the Chinese Revolution and Trotsky of a “permanent 
revolution” with all Marxists aiming to align into a World 
Revolution: “...it is impossible for a genuine people’s revolution 
to win victory in any country without various forms of help 
from the international revolutionary forces...” (Zedong as 
quoted by Turok 2012:61). 
Thirdly, an example of a Psychological explanation:
A revolution will occur when a population concludes that 
its situation is so undesirable that it can stand it no more. 
In order to alleviate its situation it rises up and destroys 
its oppressors. Or, a population have some idea of what 
they ought to be receiving during the general course of 
their lives. When they find themselves confronted with a 
situation in which the gap between what they think they 
ought to be getting and what they are getting is growing, 
and is getting wider and wider, they are likely to rise up. The 
work of Davies (1962:6) and his J-curve serves as an example 
of this last group (Cohan 1975:3).
According to the J-curve, people’s expectations rise over 
time due to modernisation. If reality does not keep track of 
expectations, the gap between the two becomes larger and 
larger and the revolutionary potential increases, as illustrated 
in Figure 1. This, according to Cohan (1975:193), is one of the 
theories of rising expectations.
Figure 1:  Davies’ J-curve 
Source: Davies, 1962:6   
Combining these definitions, explanations and their broader 
associated academic frameworks, Cohan (1975) postulates that 
a definition of revolution should encompass the following 
observable elements:
• an alteration of values or the myth of a particular system;
• an alteration of the social structure;
• a change in the political institutions;
• legality or illegality of the change;
• elite alteration, and
• the use of violence.
These elements need to be further clarified. The alteration 
of values or dominant myths, according to Huntington 
(2006:264), is a universally accepted element of revolution. 
Structural alteration too is a fundamental characteristic of 
a revolution as it is a transition from one historical epoch to 
another. Hence, a revolution is a transformation of an entire 
system. Institutional change may be the abolishment of an 
institution or the abolishment of some of the functions of an 
institution; it may also create new institutions or new functions 
for an institution. Pettee (1938:22) suggests a reconstitution of 
the state, to such an extent that, in accordance with Huntington, 
not only are the institutions redesigned but also the myths and 
values that underpin them. Elite alteration may be as simple as 
a personnel change, or as complicated as an elite transfusion 
by drawing a new elite from a different class and eradicating 
the old elite or class. Legality or illegality has to do with the 
fact that at some point the revolution is designated illegal by 
the regime, and upon success, the previous ‘terrorist rebels’ 
become the new legal government if they have legitimacy in the 
eyes of the citizens and the international community. Violence 
is a key ingredient in the Huntington definition; it is also a 
key concept in the Marxian notion of revolution. Mao Zedong 
famously noted that revolution is not a tea party; thus, it is safe 
to assume that a revolution will entail some sort of violence, 
if not outright terror and terrorism (Cohan 1975:14-27; Marek 
1969:121).
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However, these elements only form part of the available 
knowledge on revolution. A perspective that has to be added 
to the six elements already discussed is that a revolution is 
a process (Mao, Trotsky and Marx); revolution is seldom a 
single event. The process involves many techniques, ranging 
from general strikes to coup d’états, to revolutionary wars, to 
even peaceful events such as ‘democratic breakthroughs’, the 
so-called Bourgeois Revolution/democracies of Trotsky, and 
negotiations, yet the revolution continues until its final goals 
are met (Greene 1990:14). “There is no reason to consider 
guerrilla warfare separately from national policy” (Zedong 
2009a:5). “When the enemy advances we retreat. If the enemy’s 
forces were weaker than ours, he would not dare advance... 
When the enemy retreats we pursue” (Zedong 2009b:11). 
From the above-mentioned it is possible to deduce two other 
elements that should be added:
• revolutions pragmatically ebb and flow, and
• revolutions seldom are single events; they are processes 
and need time to fulfil  their goals.
Both Greene (1990) and Cohan (1975) state that the revolutions 
that have been studied in the past have been the so-called 
Great Revolutions. Four of these great revolutions are studied 
by Brinton (1965) in his book, The Anatomy of Revolution. There 
are also a myriad of incomplete revolutions or unsuccessful 
revolutions that, according to Greene (1990:14), if studied, could 
contribute not only to the study of revolution as a process, but 
also to the fact that revolution should be understood along the 
lines of a continuum of patterns of collective behaviour. 
If it is understood that revolution is not conducted in isolation 
or by individuals, or even by small groups, a ninth element 
becomes discernible: 
• Revolution is a pattern of collective behaviour (Greene) 
that needs the support of the masses (Mao).
Huntington (2006:1) states that the most important distinction 
between countries is their degree of government. It appears 
that Huntington and Greene are essentially in agreement 
with the view of complete order at one end of a continuum, 
and revolution somewhere toward the other end on the same 
continuum, which is illustrated below.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Understanding the Revolutionary  
  Continuum
Source: Own construct
Importantly, revolution is not a single ‘point’, it is ‘a scale’ of 
intensity of conflict, and only one alternative with intensity-
levels that may fluctuate, due to for instance, rebel strength, 
or strategy, and the degree of government in a state. Thus, a 
revolution is unlikely to occur in a state where there is a high 
degree of (good) government, such as in Switzerland, Germany 
or the United Kingdom, and more likely to occur where people 
are aware that they are deprived of services by a lower degree 
of government (see Davies’ J-curve), or where they are trying to 
modernise (Huntington & Brinton1). 
This leads to a tenth element:
• Revolution has to be understood along a continuum.
As was said in the introduction, “the revolution” in some 
countries contains a moral imperative of righteousness. 
Everything done in the name of the revolution is in an almost 
religious sense correct or necessary. The claim is then made 
that when somebody speaks in the name of “the revolution” he 
or she speaks with the force of justice. 
This leads to an eleventh element of revolution that can be 
described as follows:
• Revolution acquires a moral/religious force that justifies 
actions.  
The above-mentioned elements provide observable 
characteristics found in the literature on revolution and form an 
analytical base (characterisation) for the concept of revolution. 
The observable elements of revolution thus far compiled are:
1. A revolution involves an alteration of values or the myth of 
a particular system;
2. an alteration of the social structure;
3. a change in the political institutions;
4. a change in what is legal and illegal (legality or illegality of 
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the change);
5. an elite alteration;
6. the use of violence;
7. revolutions pragmatically ebb and flow;
8. revolutions seldom are single events; they are processes 
and need time to fulfil their goals.
9. revolution is a pattern of collective behaviour that needs 
the support of the masses;
10. revolution has to be understood along a continuum of 
intensity; and
11. revolution acquires a moral/religious force that can justify 
actions2.
The characteristics of revolution were arrived at by the analysis 
of definitions available in the academic literature on the 
subject. In an effort to gain more theoretical reference, or to 
find grounds to discredit some elements above, the work of 
pre-eminent scholars from the Great Revolution schools, the 
Functionalists and the Neo-Marxists, are analysed in more 
detail. The first scholar set apart for further analysis is Crane 
Brinton from the Great Revolution School.
4 CRANE BRINTON (THE STUDY OF 
GREAT REVOLUTIONS)
In his book The Anatomy of Revolution (1975) Brinton analyses 
four revolutions, namely the English (1640-1660), the French 
(1789-1799), the American (1775-1783), and the Russian (1917) 
revolutions, all extensive or grand milestone revolutions 
(Brinton 1965:23-24). The goal of Brinton’s comparison is “to 
see whether there are not in these four revolutions uniformities 
which can be grouped together...” (Brinton 1965:78). The results 
of his comparison produce insights, firstly concerning the old 
regimes, followed by the first stages of the revolution, the rule 
of the moderates, the accession of the extremists, the reigns of 
terror and virtue, and thermidor. 
4.1 The old regimes
When studying the old regimes (the regimes against which 
the revolution is aimed), Brinton (1965:39) looks for signs of 
the impending breakdown. One of his findings was that all the 
revolutions were preceded by an inept ruling class: the Tsar 
of Russia ignorant of the majority of the peasants’ plight; the 
aristocracy in France, the monarchy in Britain, ignorant of the 
2 Examples of this can be found in the Arab spring in Egypt where 
the Muslim Brotherhood as a political and religious organisation 
superseded other secular organisations in the revolution in that 
country. The most interesting example of a revolution driven by 
religion is the one of ISIS or ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham or 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant). This revolutionary movement is 
unique in history as it is the first one to claim territory. 
power and plight of their new colony in America; and Charles 
I of England suspending parliament in an arrogant assumption 
of the divine right of kings. Implicit in this ineptitude, but not 
explicitly stated by Brinton, is the fact that a small privileged 
minority were not cognisant of, not only the wishes of the 
masses, but also their relative socio-economic deprivation or 
their perception thereof and their thinking on the issue; the 
masses were not going to tolerate it any longer, and in the 
minds of the ruling class the perception remained that this 
could be dealt with, usually by means of arms used with brutal 
force (Brinton 1965:53). 
Another factor Brinton (1965:39) identifies is the transfer of 
the allegiance of the intellectuals. The masses’ perception of 
their situation, or their actual situation, usually brings about 
a distancing between groups (the oppressor and oppressed in 
the Marxist vernacular). As soon as the intellectuals (usually 
a more privileged group) switch their allegiance, two things 
occur. The masses become more organised and their opinions 
are expressed more clearly, while the opposition loses the ability 
to generate new thinking (ideology) in what can be termed the 
first stages of the revolution. 
4.2 The first stages of the Revolution
According to Brinton, it is difficult to determine exactly when 
a revolution began (or when it ended). For Brinton (1965:86), 
the most important uniformity he discerned in his comparison 
of the revolutions was that at one point or another in the first 
stage of revolution the constituted authority was challenged. 
“In such instances the routine response of any authority is 
to have recourse to force…” (Brinton 1965:86). According to 
Brinton, the results of this recourse were, according to his 
case studies, unsuccessful; therefore, the first stage ends with 
the victory of the revolutionists and the beginning of a short 
honeymoon period, the rule of the moderates. 
4.3 The rule of the moderates
After the victory the business of government and governing by 
the victorious revolutionaries begins. At first the moderates 
ascend into positions of primacy. These people have been the 
primary opposition and it seems only natural that they form 
the new government. However, it is difficult to provide for 
all the needs of the people, and it is equally difficult not to 
seem similar to the previous elite, or even to assimilate the 
previous elite, some of their priorities and some of their goals. 
“At this stage in the revolution, the moderates in control of 
the formal machinery of government are confronted by the 
extremists, or if you prefer, merely by radical and determined 
opponents, in control of machinery devised for propaganda, 
pressure-group work, even insurrection” (Brinton 1965:122). 
 
 Faced by the opposition of the more radical groups (who might 
have been alliance partners against oppression) organised in 
the network of “the illegal government”, the moderates have 
three choices: they may try to suppress the illegal government, 
they may try to gain control of it, or they may try to ignore 
it. In reality, according to Brinton (1965:137), policy usually 
varies between these alternatives, resulting in a situation that 
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only serves to encourage the enemies of the current regime, 
resulting in the accession of the extremists. 
4.4 The accession of the extremists
The accession of the extremists “is marked by a series of exciting 
episodes: here street fighting, there forced seizure of property, 
almost everywhere heated debates, attempted repressions, a 
steady stream of violent propaganda” (Brinton 1965:148).
The extremists gain control of government because they 
secure control over the network of the illegal government. 
They oust any and all active and effective opponents from 
all organisations within the illegal government; thus, the 
centralisation, authority, discipline and single-mindedness of 
the successful extremists are first developed within the realm 
of the network of the illegal government. These characteristics 
remain when the illegal government becomes legal and the 
reigns of terror and virtue begin (Brinton 1965:175-177).
4.5 The reigns of terror and virtue
According to Brinton (1965:177), the reign of terror is not limited 
only to the significant objects such as the guillotine, or the 
hangman’s noose; it also occurs in everyday life. In fact, politics 
becomes everyday life during the reign of terror. Political 
indifference becomes impossible, and has different meanings 
for the insider and the outsider. For the outsider, defined as not 
actively hostile, the average person not directly involved and not 
on the bandwagon, life becomes complicated. He has to prove 
himself to be above suspicion and in line with the new thinking 
and vernacular. Missteps can lead to social alienation, loss of 
work, detention, and even death. For the insider, a person who 
is part of the new epoch, the new revolutionary calendar can be 
very exciting; everyone is confronted by the fact that…
If there is only one truth, and you have that truth completely, 
toleration of differences means an encouragement to error, 
crime, evil, sin. Indeed toleration in this sense is harmful to the 
tolerated, as well as very trying on the tolerator... it is a positive 
benefit to the obstinate heretics to kill them because the longer 
they live the more damnation they heap upon themselves 
(Brinton 1965:194).
Thus there is immense pressure on the individual to do what 
is commonly accepted. When the reigns of terror and virtue 
subside, what follows is thermidor.  
4.6 Thermidor
Brinton (1965:205) calls thermidor a period of convalescence 
from the fever of the revolution. He is quick to add that this 
period is not benign and it is not easy to determine when the 
rule of the extremists subsides into thermidor. According 
to Brinton, this period is primarily characterised by the 
establishment of a tyrant or an unconstitutional leader. There 
is also a return to the church in one sense or another and an 
observable search for pleasure. “With the abandonment of 
price fixing and in the inflation that followed, a class of newly 
rich speculators, war profiteers and clever politicians arose” 
(Brinton 1965:219). Along with sexual perversion, prostitutes, 
and the “gilded youth”, all the revolutionaries at this stage seem 
intent on spending money, seemingly forgetting the past. 
In summation: the following aspects regarding revolution are 
important according to Brinton: 
Brinton’s contribution by way of comparing the four revolutions 
has at its core the various stadia into which he places various 
aspects of the (completed, great) revolutions. Despite the noted 
contribution Briton makes, he does not include the “incomplete 
revolutions” that Huntington mentions, or the more detailed 
analysis of the causes of revolution that the Marxist scholars 
and the scholars offering psychological explanations pay so 
much attention to. Furthermore, in this very short overview 
of Brinton’s The Anatomy of Revolution nothing is found that 
contradicts the eleven elements described in section 3 of this 
article. In fact, Brinton emphasises several of the definition’s 
elements. The facts that revolutions evolve through stages, 
which will at times involve illegal actions that include 
violence, are elements already included. Brinton, however, 
adds subtleties: according to him the stages might be difficult 
to discern from each other as they flow rapidly from one to the 
other, or in some cases the flow takes place in such a manner 
that it cannot be said when one stage ends and another begins. 
Concerning violence, Brinton adds that it will occur or will 
be condoned because some in society, in times of revolution, 
profess ultimate knowledge about right and wrong, and this has 
the inevitable concomitant that there is a sense of righteousness 
and the assumption of the right to determine what is right and 
wrong, and the wrong (so-called evil) must and will be purged. 
This description is markedly similar to the eleventh element 
discussed in section 3, where the act of revolution conveys the 
force of legitimate justice on the revolutionary.
The most important element of critique that can be levelled 
against the analysis of Brinton is that he only analysed “Great 
Revolutions” such as the French (1789-1799) and the Russian 
revolutions (1917) that he viewed from an historical perspective. 
These revolutions are complete (see Huntington below) 
revolutions that do not reflect modern complexities in society 
or practical complexity such as nuclear or biologic weapons. 
The following scholar included for a more detailed analysis is 
Samuel Huntington.
5 SP HUNTINGTON (FUNCTIONALISM)
Functionalism is the school of thought that proposes to 
explain institutions and practices in terms of the functions 
they perform (Mclean & McMillan 2003:214). Thus, according 
to Cohan (1975:120), functionalists concern themselves with 
a conflict potential in society that may or may not be realised 
(there are many ways in which developments can eventually 
play out). This is in direct opposition to the Marxist proposition 
that conflict is endemic and inevitable in society. According 
to Fukuyama (2006:xi), Huntington’s work Political Order in 
Changing Societies (2006) had enormous influence, and as 
such has to be included in this perspective on revolution. The 
Functionalism school of thought can be disaggregated into 
the following components: degree of government, impact of 
Page 7 of 10 Original Research
www.koersjournal.org.za dx.doi.org/10.19108/koers.80.3.2246
modernisation, types of revolution, complete versus incomplete 
revolutions, and praetorian politics.  
5.1 Degree of government
According to Huntington (2006:1), the most important 
distinction among countries concerns not their form of 
government, but their degree of government. The higher the 
levels of institutionalisation in a state, the better are the chances 
of that state’s survival during times of internal upheaval. 
Institutionalisation or the legitimisation of the processes 
and structures of state organisations and power reflects the 
relationship between political institutions and the social forces 
(ethnic, religious, territorial, economic and/or status group) 
within the geographical boundaries of the state (Huntington 
2006:8). 
Modernisation (an attempt to gain a higher degree of 
government through capital investment), as happened in the 
Third World during the 1950s and 1960s, produced political 
disorder.
If poor countries appear unstable, it is not because they are 
poor, but because they are trying to become rich. A purely 
traditional society would be ignorant, poor and stable. By 
the mid-twentieth century, however, all traditional societies 
were also transitional or modernizing societies. It is precisely 
the devolution of modernization throughout the world 
which increased the prevalence of violence about the world 
(Huntington 2006:41).
This instability is caused by a cascade of events set in motion by 
the effort to modernise.
5.2 The impact of modernisation
According to Huntington (2006:55), modernisation leads to 
the introduction of new ideas and values; this leads to social 
mobilisation. Because there is no concurrent economic 
development (refer to the J-curve of Davies) to satisfy demand, 
social frustration accumulates. People search for opportunities 
of socio-economic mobility, which also are limited. The people 
themselves have become (politically) mobilised (active) and 
want to improve their destiny; they are dissatisfied with the 
government and its institutions (which are also developing 
slowly) and this leads to un-channelled political participation. 
Unfortunately, no legal or legitimate structures (institutions) 
exist in which this up to now unknown level of participation 
can be dealt with in a positive manner. This leads to political 
instability. If such a situation is left uncontrolled, two types of 
revolutions (Western and Eastern) might result. 
5.3 Two types of revolution
Huntington (2006:266-267) identifies two “patterns of 
revolution” - a Western and an Eastern revolution. According to 
the Western pattern, the political institutions of the old regime 
collapse as a first step, and then a mobilisation of various groups 
occurs with political benefits in view. The Eastern revolution, 
on the other hand, begins with the mobilisation of new groups 
and the building of parallel structures - the goal of which is the 
destruction of the current order:
In terms of our twin concerns of institutions and participation, 
the Western revolution moves through the collapse of the 
established political institutions, the expansion of participation, 
the creation of new institutions... the pattern of the Eastern 
revolution is quite different. The expansion of political 
participation and the creation of new political institutions are 
carried on simultaneously and gradually by the revolutionary 
counter elite and the collapse of the political institutions of 
the old regime marks the end rather than the beginning of the 
revolutionary struggle (Huntington 2006:271).
Both these two types of revolution involve the expansion of 
political participation, the organisation of that participation, 
and the destruction of the established order. Another 
distinction Huntington offers is between complete and 
incomplete revolutions. 
5.4  Complete versus incomplete revolutions
According to Huntington (2006:335), the contribution of 
communism (especially Leninism) is the “complete revolution”. 
This is a revolution where the chaos of dramatic social change is 
followed not by anarchy, but by the institutionalisation of new 
political structures.  Incomplete revolutions, on the other hand, 
are explained as follows: “Before the Bolshevik revolution no 
revolution was politically complete,” according to Huntington, 
“because no revolutionary leaders had formulated a theory 
explaining how to organise and to institutionalise the expansion 
of political participation which is the essence of revolution… 
Lenin solved this problem...” by enabling the formation of new 
government institutions during and sometimes before the 
revolution (Huntington 2006:335-337). Brinton calls this the 
illegal government. Part of the illegal government is rooted in 
praetorian politics. 
5.5 Praetorian politics
Praetorianism, in a limited sense, refers to the intervention of 
the military in politics (Huntington 2006:195). In modernising 
societies, politics lacks autonomy, complexity, coherence and 
adaptability; all sorts of social forces become directly involved 
in general politics. Countries with political armies also have 
political clergies, political universities, political bureaucracies 
and political labour unions (Huntington 2006:195). The 
problem with a praetorian system is that confrontation of 
power occurs openly, without the mitigating concomitant effect 
of institutions such as the court systems, laws, and/or powerful 
government structures. Therefore, no agreement exists 
among the groups as to the legitimate methods for resolving 
conflict; this leads to military interference in politics that most 
commonly takes the form of a coup (Huntington 2006:196). 
In summation: the following aspects regarding revolution are 
important according to Huntington: He presents the field of 
study of revolutions with a vast richness of concepts that fit into 
his broader perspective and theory on political decay. Brinton 
discusses the stages of revolution; Huntington pays attention 
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to the causes with the issue of legitimacy of institutions during 
times of what he calls modernisation, central to his argument. 
Again, nothing in Huntington’s Political Order in Changing 
Societies contradicts the elements set for in section3. Being a 
functionalist, Huntington focuses on what revolutions want3 
to accomplish; therefore many of the changes in values, myths, 
systems and society as a whole that Huntington emphasises are 
included in the elements as described in section 3. 
The most important element of critique that can be 
levelled against Huntington is twofold in nature: 1) He sees 
modernisation as the primary cause of instability while there 
are several other important causes such as relative deprivation; 
and 2) He sees the modernisation process and the desire of 
poor Nations to become modern as inevitable.  Furthermore 
Huntington as an example of the broader school, exemplifies 
the fact that conflict does not have a negative impact; it only has 
“functionalities”, leading to some labelling the Functionalist 
School as practitioners of “consensus theory” (Holmwood 
2005:100). The next scholar set up for analysis, Herbert 
Marcuse, comes from the modern Marxist tradition and as such 
differs considerably from the previous two.
6 HERBERT MARCUSE (NEO-MARXIST)
More recent theorists are classified as falling in the Marxist 
tradition because of their acceptance of the Marxist model 
of revolution and they are theorists and philosophers 
such as Herbert Marcuse, Franz Fanon and Régis Debray 
(Cohan 1975:110-111). Each made a major contribution to 
revolutionary analysis generally, and to modern Marxist analysis 
in particular. As an example of contemporary Marxist thought 
about revolution, the work of Marcuse will be examined with 
regard to the role of class, the Cultural Revolution, freedom, the 
role of the state, and what has been termed Marcuse’s dilemma. 
6.1 The role of class
In Marcuse’s work on the role of class in revolution, he rejects the 
working class as a group with revolutionary potential. Marcuse 
states that society in the 1960s and 70s has become so rich that 
even the workers are well off and no longer have revolutionary 
potential. Thus, according to Marcuse, mobilisation of the 
population in the advanced industrial societies has tended 
to militate against the type of conflict that Marx foresaw. 
There has been a unification of former opposite classes that 
bears on the possibilities of social change. The revolutionary 
classes now are the outsiders, the exploited, the persecuted 
by other races, the unemployed and the unemployable 
(Cohan 1975:111; Woddis 1972:294). The revolution of this 
new revolutionary class will be a revolution encompassing all 
aspects of human existence and culture.  
6.2 The Cultural Revolution
Marcuse also focuses on the totality of modern radicalism; 
what he calls “subversion of the not only established economic 
3 The personalisation of a phenomenon such as revolution is a 
characteristic of the Functionalist School. 
and political structure”, but also (and primarily) on the entire 
established culture which the radicals define as the “bourgeois 
culture” (Marcuse, 2001:123). It may, according to Marcuse, 
be that this all-encompassing Cultural Revolution not only 
precedes the political revolution, but at a certain stage absorbs 
the more traditional revolution. Under modern capitalism, 
basic economic institutions and relationships reproduce 
themselves in all spheres of society. This total integration has 
to meet its total negation through the total claim of the Cultural 
Revolution (Marcuse 2001:124). Yet, even this revolution cannot 
provide absolute “freedom”.     
6.3 Freedom
According to Marcuse, freedom exists only as a desired goal; 
there is no freedom in reality. That is the base from which all 
revolutions have to start as the continuum of history allows no 
break and every new society holds something from the previous. 
As Marcuse continues with this argument it becomes clear 
why stoic Marxists such as Woddis (1972) would criticise him. 
Firstly, Marcuse’s arguments about new revolutionary classes 
and the new nature of the cultural revolution are difficult to 
understand, and secondly, he debunks the religious nature 
of Marxism even as he upholds the theoretical and practical 
value: “It must be emphasised that the Marxian base is... a 
human base”, and thus has no scientific or religious value 
(Marcuse 2001:125). Therefore, the new revolutionary class 
must realise that even the “socialist-” or “Marxist-state” is 
fallible and in Marcuse’s era has become entities driven by 
capital, and employing (and exploiting) workers.  
6.4 The role of the state
According to Marcuse (1998:222), the societal tendency towards 
state socialism is anti-revolutionary:
Power over the means of production has been transferred to 
the state, which exercises this power through the employment 
of wage labour. The state has also assumed the role of the 
direction of capital as a whole. The direct producers do not 
control production (and with it their destiny) any more than 
they do the system of liberal-democratic capitalism. They 
remain subordinated to the means of production.
 In this way, state socialism maintains the foundations of a 
class society. The implication of this is far-reaching - a socialist 
state organised in this way (direction of capital as a whole) is no 
longer the solution, but the object of revolution. This gives rise 
to a difference between Marcuse’s interpretation of Marx and 
more traditional Marxists. 
6.5 Different interpretation of Marx
Because Marcuse lived in different times from the original 
Marxist theorists, he evolved with the theories of Marxism: 
“Intellectual opposition to the prevailing form of life 
[in the 1960s and ‘70s] seems to become increasingly 
impotent and ineffective. The aim of this opposition: man’s 
liberation from domination and exploitation has failed to 
materialise although the historical conditions for its realisation 
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have been attained...” (Marcuse 1998:201). 
In summation: the following aspects regarding revolution 
are important according to Marcuse: Because he lived in 
different times from the original Marxist theorists, he 
evolved together with the evolving theories of Marxism. In 
the first instance, Marcuse saw revolution occurring without 
violence, in the sphere of the mind. This process might then, 
as a second instance, later lead to violence and the Cultural 
Revolution evolving into a traditional revolution. This 
evolution is necessary to negate the effects of modern society 
where classes are structured differently. Therefore, the first 
bastion of revolution is the mind where a Cultural Revolution, 
encompassing every aspect of society, must with a compelling 
force occur. The new revolutionary class is the outsider in 
society, the unemployed and the unemployable, the people 
who are discriminated against and are left without recourse 
to the system. This outsider class will unite and so, comprising 
intellectuals and peasants, the spear of the revolution will be 
formed.  In the case of Marcuse, there is a definite de-emphasis 
on violence as the Cultural Revolution will not necessarily need 
to include violence.   
Criticism levelled at Marcuse includes the fact that he moved too 
far away from Marxist tenets in having discarded the dialectic 
and that elements of idealism can certainly been seen in his 
work. He also does not see “the workers” as the revolutionary 
class. Marcuse’s conception of revolution without violence (at 
least in the first stages of the modern revolution) is in direct 
contrast to most definitions of revolution. Huntington, Brinton 
and especially, Marxists4 such as Lenin distinctly emphasises 
that revolutions incorporate violence. In Egypt and Tunisia 
during the Arab Spring5 revolutions started peacefully but 
quickly became violent as religious groups became to organise 
and religious intolerance became a sub theme.
8 CONCLUSION
It is possible to add various elements from the three scholars 
analysed above to the elements compiled in section 3. It would 
equally be possible to add elements from other scholars. This 
practice would then lead to a listing of elements some of 
which would overlap, with a resulting list maybe comprising 
several pages. This would be due to the nature of the use and 
perhaps overuse of the concept revolution, which was spoken 
of in the introduction. This practice would be the opposite of 
a characterisation which according to Babbie and Mouton 
(2008:113) should be 1) systematic, 2) mutually exclusive, 
and 3) exhaustive.  For the purposes of this article the eleven 
elements in section 3 are proposed to fulfil the criteria above. 
Importantly, this assertion must be tested by the use of this 
characterisation (comprising the eleven elements) as a tool to 
analyse recent revolutions in order to ascertain the veracity and 
validity of the characterisation. Due to the limitations of space 
4  Marx himself, in his early writings did not emphasize the need for 
violence in a revolution, later on in his life he became more “radical.”
5  The Arab Spring refers to the democratic uprisings that arose and 
started to spread across the Arab world in 2011.
this will be done in a follow-up article. Furthermore, in the 
work of each of the scholars analysed above, especially Brinton 
and Marcuse, the almost religious justification inherent in 
revolution is highlighted. In the text above the examples of 
China and South Africa were cited. It seems that the fever of 
revolution (according to Brinton) is brought to even higher 
temperature when the revolution is seen as a motive force in 
history (the Marxists) and so the revolution becomes a goal in 
itself, abstracted from other realities through ideology, in fact 
superseding other interpretations of reality (Brinton), just as a 
religion would be. This same revolution/religion also provides 
the opportunity to gain material and immaterial goods. 
The characterisation above represents, in a deconstructionist 
sense, a new look at the concept revolution. After more than 100 
years of what Sartori (1970:19) calls ‘conceptual stretching’, this 
might be exactly what is needed. Change and violence continue 
to characterise systems - be it on inter- or intrastate level. The 
demise of the ‘predictability’ of the ‘stable bipolar world order’ 
and the dominance of a few super-states has led to an escalation 
in lower level intrastate conflict. Conceptual clarity, as well 
as insightful analytical instruments, is needed to foster the 
understanding of these complexities. The characterisation of 
revolution in the first instance argues for the critical evaluation 
of the available literature, and secondly, endeavours to 
contribute to the hermeneutical process regarding the highly 
discursive concept of revolution.
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